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CONCLUSIONS ON TRIP
(Sec. Dulles' Trip to Middle East - May 11-May 29, 1953

1. Lack of stability in Area:

Political stability required for internal progress and building of defensive strength of area is lacking. Also, almost entire area caught in fanatical revolutionary spirit that causes countries to magnify their immediate problems and deprociate basic Soviet threat.

Causes for this situation lie in both political and economic fields.

On political side, disputes such as that in Egypt, the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Arab-U.K. boundary disputes, the Iranian problem serve to produce situations of intense Xenophobia and distrust of the West, and the friction between India and Pakistan, relating principally to Kashmir, creates a delicate and uneasy balance of power.

On the economic and social side mass poverty, classdistinction, and general awakening of mass of people to their lot is producing demands which Governments are unable to fulfill.

2. Position of the Great Powers:

In this situation the position of the Western powers has deteriorated to the point where they are not at present serving as factors of stability.

British position rapidly deteriorating, probably to the point of non-repair. Generally in the area, India and Jordan being partial exceptions, we find an intense distrust and dislike for the British. The days when the Middle East used to relax under the presence of British protection are gone. Such British troops as are left in the area are more a factor of instability rather than stability.

French cultural influence still has some grasp in Syria and Lebanon but there is no respect for the French as a political force. There is widespread and intense association with the freedom aspirations of Tunisian and Moroccan people.

United States position also not good, and the loss of respect for the United States varies almost directly with the nearness of the respective Arab States to Israel. The Israeli factor, and the association of the U.S.

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in the minds of the people of the area with French and British colonial and imperialistic policies, are millstones around our neck.

3. Danger of the present trend:

The Near East wavers between outright neutralism in the East-West struggle and the desire (but also the fear) of being protected by the West.

Nations bordering Soviet or satellite bloc more aware of the real danger and in general are more willing to cooperate with each other and with U. S. in defense. It seems probable that action or inaction of the United States will be decisive, for the nations of this area no longer feel that the British or French are really major powers.

The United States must therefore increase its influence in the Middle East at the earliest possible moment.

4. What the United States must do:

(a) Arab-Israeli Problem:

We must seek every possible means to allay fear in the Arab world over future Israeli objectives and to convince the Arab World that the United States is operating upon a policy of true impartiality.

We must make the Arabs realize that we accept the State of Israel as a fact and that any thought of turning back the pages of history is totally unrealistic.

We must seek a step by step reduction of tension in the area and an ultimate peace settlement. Any move on our part for immediate and total peace would be unrealistic. We must, rather, move forward on problems such as re-settlement of the refugees, the reduction of tension, reduction of friction along boundaries and realistic modification thereof, compensation, repatriation, and the status of Jerusalem.

(b) Solution to other Specific Problems:

The U. S. must exert every proper effort to find solution or at least ease situation in Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia and on problem of India-Pakistan relations.

The first three of these raise fundamental problems with the British. Efforts by the U.S., which by natural inclination and self interest finds itself somewhat in the middle between the British and Near Eastern positions, are increasingly resented by British. They interpret our policy as one which in fact hastens their loss of prestige in area. To some extent, regardless of efforts to the contrary on our part, this may be true. However, this is, for most part, due to natural evolution in area, and altered world power relationships between the U.S. and U.K., more than to specific action on our part.

The U.S. has a delicate role to play in these situations. We must attempt solutions of local problems in Near East without so worsening our relations with Britain as to unduly weaken or wreck the NATO alliance. Our efforts with British must be such as will avoid being placed in position where we must choose between maintenance of NATO alliance and action to keep large portion of world that is still free from drifting into Soviet hands. We should seek to deal with these specific problems individually within this limited area of maneuver.

The India-Pakistan problem does not involve relations with Britain except that both are members of the Commonwealth. Our position would probably be worsened by attempt to dictate solution and best efforts will probably be obtained by continuous friendly pressures, particularly on India, for solution.

(c) Problem of Colonialism:

We must convince the Arab States that the U.S. operates on a policy of its own with regard to this problem. That policy is sympathy for the legitimate aspirations of the people in accordance with our own historical traditions. We must press the French and British to move in this direction. We must convince the local States, however, that this process of evolution must be orderly. We must steadily remind them of the philosophy of the Kremlin, which gives clear indication that Soviet strategy plans to use extreme nationalism for its own purposes.

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(d) Assistance to the Area:

It is of utmost importance that U.S. assistance to the area be somewhat increased and the Point IV concept sharpened in its application. The economic status of the States in the area has throughout history been sub-standard. People are beginning to expect improvement and have no confidence in any Government that does not at least hold hope in this direction. The nature of the area is such that private capital cannot alone initially do the job. It is in U.S. interests to provide small amount of economic development funds in certain States of the area and to encourage economic-development use of oil revenue where available. We should utilize our funds primarily for water development which will alleviate certain specific problems such as re-settlement of refugees. It is also in our interest to provide a small amount of military equipment to certain selected States. Such military assistance would be utilized for purposes of internal security, of strengthening defense of the area and obtaining political advantage.

(e) Defense of the Area:

We must accept fact that there is today virtually no defense in the Middle East, except for the Turkish flank position. We must also accept fact that political situation is such that Arab States will not, at this time, openly join defensive arrangements with a combination of Western powers and that that constitutes a dangerous gap in the northern tier which is otherwise sensitive to Soviet threat. We must therefore avoid becoming fascinated with concepts that have no reality. We should rather, through measures such as the above, seek to improve the general situation without demand for specific quid pro quo on our part. Where we do require certain guarantees on the part of local States, these should be simple, direct and devoid of legalisms. We are not in general in a position to demand specific return for our investment at this stage. The only chance is to proceed with indication of trust and friendship and hope to obtain results.

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